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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LARRY RAY REEVES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v,
GEIGY PHARMACEUTICAL, INC.,
a division of CIBA-GEIGY
CORPORATION, a New York
corporation; ELI LILLY &
COMPANY, an Indiana corporation;
and GERALD R. MORESS, M.D.,

Case No. 860409
13-B

Defendants-Respondents,
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment
in favor of the respondents in view of the plaintiff's
failure to file affidavits or produce other evidence
demonstrating a genuine dispute as to any material fact?

APPLICABLE STATUTE
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
(f) When affidavits are unavailable.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This was a products liability case coupled with a
medical malpractice action in which it was alleged that the
plaintiff sustained burns over approximately fifty-five
percent of his body after using Phenobarbital manufactured by
defendant Eli Lilly & Co., and Tegretol, manufactured by
the defendant Geigy Pharmaceutical, both of which had been
prescribed by the defendant Gerald R. Moress, M.D., as anticonvulsants.

The plaintiff filed suit on February 8, 1984.

After considerable discovery, the defendants filed motions for
summary judgment on April 28, 1986.

The motions were initially

scheduled to be heard on May 19, 1986, but were postponed
pursuant to a 56(f) motion and affidavit filed by the
plaintiff.

On June 2, 1986, Judge J. Dennis Frederick granted

the defendant's motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff
failed to file affidavits or point to any other evidence
demonstrating any genuine dispute as to material fact.

The

plaintiff appeals Judge Frederick's decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
1961.

Plaintiff Larry Reeves was born December 5,

In about 1974, while in sixth grade, he began

experiencing epileptic seizures for which he was initially seen
by Dr. Levere Poulson, who prescribed Phenobarbital.
(Depo. of Mrs. Alma Look pp. 16-17.)
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7.

On October 31, 1981, at approximately 7:30

a.m., the plaintiff noted that the top layer of his skin began
peeling off after taking a shower.

He was admitted into the

University Medical Center where he was treated by Dr. Glen
Warden.

Approximately fifty-five percent of the plaintiff's

superficial skin peeled off.

Seven days after admission, an

additional ten percent of his skin peeled off.
pp. 5-10.)

(Warden Depo.

(R. at 212)
8.

The plaintiff was initially diagnosed as

suffering from Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN), which is a
dermatological disorder which results in loss of skin at
various degrees.
pp. 12-13.)

The etiology is unknown.

(Warden Depo.

(R. at 212)
9.

The burns plaintiff suffered were full

thickness, meaning that they were third degree, extending
entirely through the skin.
10.

(Warden Depo. p. 21.)

(R. at 212)

Plaintiff was treated for his burns at the

University Medical Center until November 25, 1981.
Thereafter, he had several additional admissions for the
purpose of treating the burns and receiving skin grafts.
Plaintiff has reached maximum improvement with respect to the
burn injury.

(Warden Depo. pp. 59-65.)
11.

(R. at 212)

On February 8, 1984, the plaintiff filed suit

against the defendants Geigy Pharmaceutical, Ciba-Geigy
Corporation ("Geigy"), Eli Lilly & Co. ("Lilly"), and
Dr. Moress.

Defendant Geigy manufactured Tegretol,

defendant Lilly manufactured Phenobarbital, and defendant
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17.

At the time the defendants filed their

motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff had no outstanding
discovery demands.
18.

The defendants1 motion for summary judgment

was supported by the affidavits of Dr. Joel A. Thompson and
Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer.
19.

(R. at 158, 162)

Dr. Thompson, through his affidavit, testified

that he was familiar with the standard of care required by
physicians and hospitals in Salt Lake City, Utah, during the
time frame the plaintiff was treated.

Dr. Thompson testified

that "the choice of medications prescribed by Dr. Moress and
the dosages were appropriate for the type of seizure condition
that Mr. Reeves had, and appropriate based upon his past
history and unresponsiveness to prior medication use."

Dr.

Thompson further stated that Dr. Moress had complied with the
degree of care, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and
provided by other neurologists in good standing in Salt Lake
City, Utah, and that the allegations that Dr. Moress was
negligent and had committed malpractice in the treatment of the
plaintiff's seizure condition were not supported by the
record.

(R. at 162-165)
20.

Dr. Swinyer testified that the Tegretol and

the Phenobarbital prescribed for the plaintiff by Dr. Moress
"were not the cause of Mr. Reeves' skin disorder."

(R. at

158-161)
21.

Defendants' motions for summary judgment were

initially scheduled to be heard on May 19, 1986.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly granted the defendants'
motions for summary judgment based upon the failure of the
plaintiff to produce any affidavit or other evidence sufficient
to establish a genuine dispute as to any material fact.
plaintiff had ample time to pursue discovery.

The

There were no

outstanding discovery requests or scheduled depositions when
the defendants filed their motions for summary judgment over
two years after the Complaint was filed.

Plaintiff could not

dispute the defendants' clear evidence that Phenobarbital and
Tegretol did not injure the plaintiff, and that Dr. Moress
had not breached any standard of care by prescribing those
drugs to the plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS.
In his February 8, 1984 Complaint, the plaintiff
claimed that in October, 1981, Tegretol and Phenobarbital
combined to cause his skin disorder.

After two years of

discovery by interrogatories, requests for production of
documents and five depositions, this allegation remained
completely unsupported.

The depositions of Dr. Zone, Dr.

Piepkorn and Dr. Warden completely failed to substantiate
plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff's primary treating physician,

Dr. Warden, affirmed that the etiology of plaintiff's skin
8

problems was unknown.

(Ward Depo. pp. 12-13. R. at 212.)

Dr.

Michael W. Piepkorn, a nationally known and respected board
certified general pathologist, dermatologist and skin
pathologist at the University of Utah Medical Center, performed
a skin biopsy on tissue taken from the burn site of plaintiff's
skin disorders.

His histological examination showed that the

skin and tissue loss were not caused by drugs.
Depo. pp. 28-29.

(Piepkorn

R. at 210.)

Dr. John Zone, a respected dermatologist at the
University of Utah with special training in immunopathology,
also tested specimens obtained from the plaintiff.

Dr. Zone

concluded that the plaintiff's drug history did not fit the
classic pattern for causing skin disorders and that the cause
of plaintiff's problem was simply unknown.
pp. 28, 56-57.

(Zone Depo. at

R. at 211.)

Further, the affidavits of Dr. Thompson and Dr.
Swinyer fully refuted the plaintiff's allegation that
Tegretol and Phenobarbital somehow caused his skin disorder and
that Dr. Moress committed malpractice by prescribing the
drugs.

Dr. Swinyer testified that Phenobarbital and Tegretol

did not cause the plaintiff's skin disorders.

Dr. Thompson

agreed that Dr. Moress acted properly by prescribing
Phenobarbital and Tegretol to the plaintiff.

According to all

of the medical experts in this case, Phenobarbital and Tegretol
were not connected to the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.
In Utah it is the plaintiff's burden to establish by
expert medical testimony the physician's standard of care and

9

that his behavior failed to conform to the proper standard.

In

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980), the
Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff must introduce expert
testimony to establish the proper standard of care:
In a majority of malpractice cases, the
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony
to establish this standard of care. Expert
testimony is required because the nature of
the profession removes the particularities
of its practice from the knowledge and
understanding of the average citizen.
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
plaintiff's obligations in medical malpractice actions in
Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982), stating:
Absent a situation where the propriety of
the treatment received is within the common
law and experience of a layman, the
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case
must prove the standard of care by expert
medical testimony.
Expert testimony is also required to causally connect Phenobarbital and Tegretol to plaintiff's injuries.

The only

exception to the expert witness rule occurs in situations where
the treatment is within a layman's knowledge and experience.
This exception has been applied by the Utah Supreme Court in
situations where a physician loses a surgical instrument during
an operation or performs an operation on the wrong part of the
body.

In such instances, "it would seem as a matter of common

sense that scientific opinion would throw little light on the
subject."

Frederickson v. Maw, 227 P.2d 772, 773 (Utah

1951).
The instant case is not one which can be determined
simply by the common sense of a layman.
10

Whether the drugs

caused plaintiff's injury required expert opinion.

Therefore,

the plaintiff had the duty to present some evidence to dispute
the affidavit and deposition testimony of the defendants.

The

plaintiff produced no evidence that Dr. Moress departed from
a proper standard of care or that Phenobarbital and Tegretol
caused the plaintiff's injury.

On the other hand, Dr.

Swinyer and Dr. Thompson, through their affidavits,
established that the care and treatment given the plaintiff
complied with acceptable medical standards and that the
Phenobarbital and Tegretol were not linked to plaintiff's
burns.

Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in granting the defendant's motions.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION.
Despite the postponement of the summary judgment
hearing until June 2, 1986, the plaintiff did not produce a
single affidavit contradicting Dr. Swinyer or Dr. Thompson,
and could not point to any evidence supporting his claim that
some defect in Phenobarbital and Tegretol caused his injury.
On May 6, 1986, the plaintiff's counsel had filed a Rule 56(f)
affidavit stating she had not had "adequate time and do not now
have time to conduct sufficient discovery regarding the facts
of this case. . . . "

(R. at 186-190)

The trial court properly

rejected plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion and affidavit.

11

Rule 56(f) grants a trial court discretion to make
any just order where a non-moving party fails to respond by
contradicting affidavits to a summary judgment motion.
Rule 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for
judgment or it may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
In every case where a party files a 56(f) affidavit,
the trial court has broad discretion to determine the proper
course of action.

The courts review the "reasons stated" by

the attorney or party for failure to present contradicting
affidavits and determine whether the circumstances justify an
extension of time to extend discovery and continue the summary
judgment hearing.

The 56(f) affidavit "directly and

forthrightly invokes the trial courtfs discretion,"

Strand v.

Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,
194 (Utah 1977) (quoting Moore's Federal Practice, 2d Ed.,
§56-24 pages 56-14-24 to 15-14-26), which will only be
disturbed on appeal if the final decision reflects an abuse of
that discretion.

Id.

Where the 56(f) affidavit results from

dilatory discovery practices, lacks merit, or presents
inadequate reasons for failure to produce contradicting
affidavits, the trial court may properly grant summary
judgment.
1984).

Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 312-313 (Utah

Further, Rule 56(f) should not be applied to postpone

12

summary judgment where there is no reason to believe that the
discovery would lead to the denial of the motion, (see
generally, Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure,
§27-40 through §28-41, 2d Ed., 1983, construing the
identical federal role), or where there has been sufficient
"time to utilize discovery proceedings prior to the hearing or
summary judgment."

Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 313.

Likewise, in Rule 56(f) cases where substantial discovery has
been completed and the facts elicited by the discovery do not,
in any way, support the plaintiff's claims, a court's decision
to grant summary judgment motion is justified.

Burlington

Coat Factory Warehouse, Corp. v. Espirit De Corp., 597
F.Supp 1199 (D.C.N.Y. 1984), affirmed in part, reversed on
other grounds in part, 769 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1985).

The

Burington trial court explained:
A granting of a continuance under Rule
56(f) has been considered to be
inappropriate in cases in which substantial
discovery has been conducted, and
plaintiff's action appears groundless.
Id. at 1202.
The courts have repeatedly emphasized that a dilatory
plaintiff cannot rely on Rule 56(f).

In Paul Kadair, Inc. v.

Sony Corp. of America, 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983), the
district court, in construing the identical federal rule,
denied the plaintiff's Rule 56(f) request to postpone summary
judgment and continue discovery, finding the plaintiff's
failure to pursue discovery for over a year prior to the
hearing dilatory.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the

13

plaintiff's one-year delay was a substantial factor supporting
the trial court1s discretion.

The Court explained that where a

plaintiff fails to produce specific facts after adequate
discovery to support its allegations a trial court may properly
refuse to permit discovery.

Something more than a "fanciful

allegation is required to justify denying a motion for summary
judgment when the moving party has met its burden of
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material
fact.11

Id. at 1030, quoting Contemporary Mission, Inc. v.

United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2nd Cir.
1981).
The courts have also delineated factors to aid in
determining whether a party is dilatory in order to assess a
Rule 56(f) motion.

Relevant factors include: 1) the length of

the pendency of the case prior to the Rule 56(f) request; 2)
whether and when the plaintiff could have anticipated the need
for the requested discovery; 3) plaintiff's previous efforts,
if any, to obtain the needed information; 4) the degree or
nature of discovery already undertaken; 5) any limitations
placed upon discovery previously by the trial court; 6) any
prior solicitations of or provisions for discovery by the trial
court; 7) any warning to plaintiff that, absent a speedy
request, discovery might be denied and his claim dismissed;
and, 8) whether the requested information was inaccessible to
the plaintiff, e.g., as when within defendant's exclusive
control, or whether alternative, accessable sources existed
but were foregone.

Kadair v. Sony, 694 F.2d at 1031.
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In the instant case, the trial court properly
rejected the plaintiff's 56(f) affidavit.

The affidavit lacked

merit, presented inadequate reasons to continue discovery, and
resulted from dilatory discovery.
First, the plaintiff's 56(f) affidavit lacked merit
and presented inadequate reasons to continue discovery.

The

affidavit did not explain or justify the plaintiff's inability
to dispute defendants' affidavits and evidence.

The affidavit

merely stated that the plaintiff's attorney did "not have
adequate time and do not now have time to conduct sufficient
discovery regarding the facts of this case . . . "

R. at 189.

The affidavit offered no explanation why plaintiff had not
pursued discovery against any of the defendants for over a year
prior to the defendants' filing for summary judgment.
Plaintiff's last discovery request to the defendants was filed
on January 30, 1985.

Fifteen months later, the plaintiff's

attorney filed an affidavit that she had not had sufficient
time to complete discovery.

The affidavit failed to provide

any reason for the 15-month delay and was properly rejected
by the trial court.
Next, the plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion resulted from
dilatory practices and does not meet the standard in Cox v.
Winters, 678 P.2d at 312-313.

The factors delineated in

Kadair v. Sony, 694 F.2d at 1031 also weigh heavily
against the defendant.

First, this case was over two years'

old when defendants filed their motions for summary judgment.
As noted, the plaintiff's last discovery requests to the
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defendants were filed on January 30, 1985, 15 months prior to
the summary judgment hearing.
Second, the plaintiff should have anticipated the
need for the requested discovery.

At the outset of the case,

it was apparent that expert medical testimony would be required
against Dr. Moress and to link Phenobarbital and Tegretol to
the plaintiff1 skin disorders.

Despite the clearly anticipated

need for such evidence, the plaintiff did not obtain expert
testimony and could not point to any evidence contradicting the
defendants1 affidavits.

Moreover, under Rule 11 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is required to investigate
the factual and legal basis for suit prior to filing a
complaint in order to ensure that the allegations are well
grounded in fact and legally warranted.

The rule properly

requires consultation with experts prior to filing the
complaint to confirm the factual basis asserted for liability.
In the instant case, the plaintiff did not consult any expert
willing to support the allegations in the complaint or
contradict Dr. Thompson or Dr. Swinyer.
Third, significant and substantial discovery has
already been completed.

The plaintiff's brief concedes that

plaintiff received thousands of pages of documents during
discovery and that five individuals were deposed.

Never-

theless, there is not any evidence to support plaintiff's
allegations and no showing that further discovery would have
been anything but cumulative and wasteful.

Finally, no prior

limitation was placed upon the plaintiff's discovery efforts by
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the trial court.

The plaintiff was given ample time and

latitude to prepare his case.
Plaintiff had more than sufficient "time to utilize
discovery proceedings prior to the hearing for summary
judgment,M

Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 313 and yet failed to

produce any evidence supporting his complaint.

Substantial

discovery has been completed, and there is no evidence
contraverting the defendant's evidence.

Summary judgment

was justified and the trial court properly denied the Rule
56(f) motion.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants request
this Court to affirm the trial court's order of summary
judgment dismissing the plaintiff with prejudice and on the
merits•
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